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The book of Linda Zagzebski deals with the serious and complex problem 
of epistemic authority – a problem concerning not only epistemology, but 
also some topics in practical philosophy: ethics and political philosophy. 
It is hard to refer to all of the issues brought up in the book, so I will 
try so to concentrate on those which, in my opinion, are most essential 
and involve the problem of self-reliance. This issue is essential and its 
correct analysis is a  condition of the possibility of conducting further 
argumentation. I  do not intend to summarize all solutions presented 
in the book; I  am only going to refer to those aspects of Zagzebski’s 
argumentation which are, in my opinion, problematic and doubtful: 
the problem of dissonance and its elimination as rational purpose; the 
problem of ‘naturalness’, the reconstruction of epistemic authority and, 
finally, the interpretation of Descartes’ philosophy.
I.
Zagzebski’s statement that our thinking consists in, generally speaking, 
the elimination of dissonance (that is the incompatibility or conflict 
between our acts or mental states), is similar to the well-known 
conception of Charles S. Peirce which was introduced in the article How 
to Make Our Ideas Clear. However, it means that analyses have a rather 
psychological character and not epistemological (in Peirce’s philosophy, 
similarly as in the philosophy of Dewey, epistemology was in fact 
replaced by cognitive psychology). But in this way we are going from 
the level of questio iuris to the level of questio facti, losing the normative 
dimension of our investigations which seem essential when we try to 
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solve problems concerning morality (discussed in chapter 8). It seems 
that we should first consider what in fact is a priority for us: harmonious 
views (psychological optimum) or whether they are true (epistemological 
optimum)? It is an  important issue because these things are not 
necessarily connected with each other. It is not that when we achieve 
harmony and coherence (as a result of the elimination of dissonance) we 
automatically achieve the truth. It can simply be the other way round. 
It is often the case that we achieve harmony at the cost of the truth, for 
example in various forms of ideology or pseudoscience (e.g. David Icke’s 
theory of reptilian humanoids is perfectly cohesive, but it seems at the 
same time totally false).1 I would even say that the excellent cohesion of 
certain systems of statements or opinions should arouse our suspicion: 
e.g. some schizophrenics’ systems of beliefs are truly harmonious and 
their verification from the point of truth must lead to the introduction 
of a deep dissonance. Also in the history of science we have numerous 
examples of the introduction within existing conceptual schemes of some 
hypotheses ad hoc in order to provide them with harmony (e.g. attempts 
to rescue Newton’s mechanics in the late 19th century). However, it did 
not increase the cognitive power of these schemes and ultimately did not 
inspire greater confidence.
II.
I have great doubts concerning whether aiming to remove dissonance 
can be regarded en bloc as a rational action. Nowadays a similar position 
is taken by Jurgen Habermas, who proposed a theory of communicative 
actions as a  general theory of the equalization of dissonances. His 
idea of a  harmonized communication based on a  global consensus, is 
presented as an  a  priori rational purpose. However, as presented by, 
among others, Nicholas Rescher in his book Pluralism: Against the 
Demand for Consensus, this assumption is highly controversial. Rescher’s 
view is exactly contrary to Habermas’s  – both in ourselves, as well as 
within a  community, a  conflict, a  dispute and dissonance are rational 
because they have a  stimulating effect. Moreover, from the point of 
1 Coherence may be a necessary condition of truth in the case of sets of statements but 
not in the case of an individual statement. We can imagine a set of incoherent statements 
which are individually true, for example pragmatically. It is one of the consequences of 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. (This, however, is not the place to discuss this problem 
in detail.)
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view of Popperian falsificationism (which in some respects is a reliable 
description of how a  scientific community works) a  rational action is 
the pursuit of dissonance and the introduction of an inconsistency into 
the system of our beliefs by submitting our hypotheses to extremely 
restrictive tests. Let us also recall a  classical example of Socrates. His 
method consisted exactly in the demolition of harmony, the introduction 
of dissonance, and finally providing his audience with no clear answers 
but with new questions and problems. I would say that this is the core of 
any philosophical and intellectual activity: posing questions, formulating 
doubts, introducing dissonance and formulating questions. And the fact 
that in solving fundamental philosophical problems, in my opinion, no 
significant progress has been made since the time of Plato, shows that 
a dissonance is included in the nature of philosophical enquiry and is 
something which supports it. So it seems that we do not need to eliminate 
dissonance but we have to maintain it.
III.
In this context it is possible to make some classifications of dissonances 
and their forms. Zagzebski makes some classification in her book (p. 50) 
where she mentions some dissonances between beliefs, emotions and 
actions as well as dissonances between beliefs and desires. I think that 
these divisions can be more sophisticated and systematic when we 
consider dissonance or incoherence on the logical or syntactic level 
(between statements), epistemic (between cognitive acts and their 
objects, i.e. between what I see and what is), as well as pragmatic (between 
statements and acts). It is evident that there is a  difference between 
immanent dissonance, taking place inside the subject between his mental 
states (cognitive, volitional, emotional), and transcendent dissonance 
between the subject (and his mental states or acts) and the world (that 
means: objects, persons, acts, cultural values, etc.). Considering different 
types of dissonances, it is clear that even acknowledging that rational 
action consists in the elimination of dissonance, it appears there is no 
one way of this elimination, because a  contradiction of my opinions 
is something different than a  conflict between acts and values or acts 
and opinions. In my opinion different types of dissonance require us to 
take into account different types of the rationality that would enable us 
with regards to them. Subsuming everything under one general category 
of rationality is not a  good idea because excessive generality lacks its 
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predicate value. One should also consider certain meta-rationality which 
is responsible for choosing some local rational actions in reference to 
specific types of dissonance.
IV.
I  am doubtful about the idea of the ‘normality’ and the ‘naturalness’ 
used by Zagzebski (e.g. pp. 86, 201-202, 251-254, where ‘normal’ is tied 
together with ‘harmony’). It is hard to state whether these terms are 
used normatively or descriptively, and whether they refer to a biological, 
cultural, or social norm, or are understood psychologically and associated 
with the internal integrity of the individual. And since Zagzebski 
closely connects the idea of rationality with ideas of the normal and the 
natural, we encounter a  big problem here, especially that the concept 
of rationality – as I demonstrated above – is also problematic. In this 
context an attempt to solve some sceptical problem by referring sceptical 
doubts to ‘what we naturally do’ seems fallible (p. 45). It is not only due 
to the vagueness of this notion, but also because it is not known why the 
‘naturalness’ would be actually regarded as a criterion of approval in case 
of philosophical scepticism (I will come back to this issue at the very end 
of this text).
V.
I  have some objections to the very analysis of the phenomenon of 
epistemic authority. This analysis is based on some thoughts of Joseph Raz 
(p. 106), concerning political authority and is some kind of extrapolation 
of his political ideas in the field of cognition. In my opinion it cannot be 
done easily, because the nature of political authority is connected with 
action (practice) and so differs from the nature of epistemic authority, 
associated rather with speculation and theory. The first authority 
concerns techne, the second episteme (or doxa) (it is possible here to refer 
to Oakeshott’s classical division of practical knowledge, that is ability, 
and theoretical knowledge – knowledge in the proper sense of the word). 
So I would disagree with the statement that epistemic authority ‘has all 
of the essential features of practical authority’ (p.  139), because these 
are two completely different kinds of the authorities. Therefore applying 
Raz’s political analyses to the area of epistemology is unfortunate and 
cannot be beneficial but rather makes the core of the issue obscure. 
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I think that clear and formal characteristics of epistemic authority (and 
authority in general) proposed half a century ago by Joseph Bochenski, 
would be a good starting point here.2 Bochenski wrote that authority is 
a relation where p is an authority for q in the domain of D, when q accepts 
everything what p is offering him, and what belongs to the domain 
of D. Bochenski precisely studied cases of justified and unjustified use 
of authority, trying to show that it is possible to describe them from 
an external point of view (third-person perspective), not only from the 
point of view of an inner conviction of an individual (because there is 
often a case when a deep confidence of the individual in the authority is 
unjustified). Bochenski analyses not only conditions in which somebody 
can be an epistemic authority for someone, but also general conditions 
for being an  authority for someone in a  certain domain. The central 
question for Bochenski is the distinction between epistemic and deontic 
authority corresponding to the above discussed distinction into episteme 
(theoretical knowledge) and doxa (practical knowledge). However, 
according to my interpretation, the most important is Bochenski’s 
statement that in the domain of practice – that is in morality, politics, the 
art of war and the like – there is no (and cannot be) epistemic authority. 
It results from the fact that there is no scientific theoretical knowledge 
which would enable anyone to become an  epistemic authority in 
moral, political or existential issues. It is possible to be an  epistemic 
authority in a field of science of morality or science of politics – but not 
in morality itself or politics itself. In these domains there are of course 
some authorities, but they have a completely different, deontic character. 
It shows that applying a  structure of political (practical) authority to 
epistemic problems cannot be made. Obviously, the thesis about the 
non-existence of epistemic authority in the domain of practice can be 
questioned, for example proponents of ethical intellectualism would 
surely disagree with it, but regardless of that I  think that Bochenski’s 
analysis deserves attention.
VI.
The last matter which I would like to discuss here is connected with a way 
in which Zagzebski analyses the philosophy of Descartes. Admittedly, in 
her book we find only brief references to this thinker in the context of the 
problem of self-reliance. However, I think that it is worthwhile to devote 
2 Joseph Bochenski, Was ist Autorität? (Freiburg: Herder, 1974).
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more attention to him because the problem of the relation of self-reliance 
and epistemic authority is precisely analyzed in Descartes’ writings.
Let us start with a simple issue. Zagzebski is right on one hand when 
claiming that ‘it is a  mistake to interpret either the Cartesian method 
of doubt or his foundationalism as a  justification of self-reliance’ 
(p. 17) (the problem is more complicated and I will refer to it later on). 
However, on the other hand she is wrong when stating that Descartes’ 
object of trust is ‘the use of human power purified by his method’ (ibid.). 
Indeed, Descartes writes in several places in Meditations that everything 
that we clearly and distinctly understand is true, but this statement is 
conditional. The method itself is not trustworthy, but needs a completely 
external guarantee. And this guarantee is divine truthfulness. In First 
Meditation Descartes analyzes cases of clear and distinct cognition, 
starting from sensory perception, and finishing on a priori mathematical 
reasoning, showing that each of these types of cognition can be dubious. 
Not only senses can deceive me – I can be deranged, I can dream – but 
it is also possible that God still deceives me (the hypothesis of the deus 
deceptor) or there is an all powerful demon deceiver who provides me 
with an entire image of my world and influences my will in such a way 
that I accept falsehood for the truth, e.g. when I think that 2 + 3 = 5 (the 
hypothesis of malin genius). Certainly, even if the malin genius exists and 
deceives me constantly, at least I am sure about my own existence, but 
nothing more, much less the existences of any external world. Therefore 
Descartes must prove that God is not a deceiver (although he needs to 
show first that I am not in the power of the almighty demon). This proof, 
as is widely known, is made in Third Meditation through the so-called 
ontological argument (and we know that this argument encounters 
substantial criticism). Descartes presents additional arguments in Fifth 
Meditation, where he writes: ‘But once I perceived that there is a God, 
and also understood at the same time that everything else depends on 
him and that he is not a deceiver, I then concluded that everything that 
I clearly and distinctly perceive is necessarily true.’3 So one can see that 
for Descartes the authority of the method is absolutely relative towards 
the authority of God and the authority of God is justified when I know 
that God is not deceiver.
3 René Descartes, Meditations, Objections, and Replies, Edited and Translated by 
R. Ariew and D. Cress (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
2006), p. 39.
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Therefore we clearly see that in the context of the philosophy of 
Descartes we cannot identify ‘epistemic self-reliance with epistemic 
autonomy’, as is suggested by Fricker and quoted by Zagzebski (p. 18). 
The situation is exactly the opposite: I can trust myself only because I am 
not autonomous  – because I  am God’s creation and as such I  am not 
misled by God.
But what happens in a  situation if God is not my creator, if I  was 
created in some other way? This eventuality is almost universally accepted 
by contemporary naturalized philosophy. Descartes also analyses this 
problem:
Perhaps there are some who would rather deny so powerful a God, than 
believe that everything else is uncertain. Let us not oppose them; rather, 
let us grant that everything said here about God is fictitious. Now they 
suppose that I came to be what I am either by fate, or by chance, or by 
a connected chain of events, or by some other way. But because deceived 
and being mistaken appear to be a certain imperfection, the less powerful 
they take the author of my origin to be, the more probable it will be that 
I am so imperfect that I am always deceived. I have nothing to say in 
response to these arguments. But eventually I am forced to admit that 
there is nothing among the things I once believed to be true which it is 
not permissible to doubt – and not out of frivolity or lack of forethought, 
but for valid and considered arguments. Thus I must be no less careful 
to withhold assent henceforth even from these beliefs than I would from 
those that are patently false, if I wish to find anything certain.4
So here we have a clearly posed problem: if I am not created by a good 
God, if I am not cognitively heteronomous on the epistemic level (e.g. 
if the basis of my cognition is not dependent on God), I  cannot have 
certain knowledge and I can never trust myself (I cannot believe even 
in the above statement). If I  am a  contingent creation of nature, it is 
possible that I am able to know something truly, but I am not able to 
verify it – I cannot know that I know something (in other words: even if 
I accidentally find the truth, I cannot know the criterion to distinguish 
truth from falsehood). But there is also a possibility that I was created by 
the evil demon deceiver, and it means that I will never find the truth. But 
of course this statement is self-referential and can also be false. In this 
case we finally reach a paradox.
4 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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However, Descartes’ solution to the problem of self-reliance is more 
complex. He writes that we cannot trust ourselves and our knowledge 
because our senses and our own minds can deceive us. But at the 
same time Descartes seems to trust himself when he states that senses 
can deceive him and the mind can be wrong. Therefore here we are 
faced with two levels on which the issue of the self-reliance is being 
considered: empirical and transcendental. The first deals with what is 
called objective knowledge, the act of cognition in which the mind is 
directed towards transcendent objects (or objects that are recognized 
as transcendent). Here I  should not trust myself, because senses can 
deceive me, the mind can draw wrong conclusions, etc. But the second 
level deals with a  type of meta-knowledge, meta-cognition where the 
mind is directed towards itself as the subject who gets to know an object. 
The discourse of Meditations is conducted at this very level: the subject 
(ego) has become an object of examination. And in this case Descartes 
seems to trust himself: when he is formulating sceptical arguments 
from the First Meditation he believes that he can draw a  conclusion 
about the impossibility of all objective knowledge. But is he right to 
do so? Can that meta-knowledge, which may be recognized as a kind 
of transcendental knowledge, be also deceptive and wrong? Can it not 
fall under methodic scepticism and sceptical arguments? It is certainly 
possible. My impressions concerning external things can be wrong in the 
same way as my knowledge about myself and about my own cognition. 
And if on the level of the meta-knowledge I find the idea of God which 
would be a guarantee of the certainty of objective knowledge, this very 
act can also be doubtful. Perhaps the idea of God and his goodness, 
which implies the impossibility of deception, is only the result of the evil 
demon’s operations who in this way is trying to deceive me about the 
value of the clear and distinct cognition.
The conclusion is that after all I  could trust myself in the act of 
objective (empirical) knowledge only if I could trust myself in the act 
of meta-knowledge (transcendental knowledge) which determines 
the methodological acceptance criteria of statements which appear at 
the first level. In other words, I could have a real objective knowledge 
if I  could correctly apply the method, but the method is reliable only 
when God is not a deceiver and when we were not created by accident. 
However, in order to know that I  was created by a  good God, I  must 
already rely on the method applied at the meta-level. But this falls under 
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the hypothesis of the evil demon who can mislead me into thinking that 
I should not be certain about conclusions formulated purely apriorical 
and analytically. After all it seems that I cannot go beyond myself – I have 
no authority except me, but my authority is confined to the certainty of 
my own being – independently of its genesis, nature and purpose. And 
it is necessary here to add that it is not even self-knowledge, but rather 
a kind of elementary self-awareness, a primitive intuition accompanying 
all of my mental acts (and also cognitive mistakes). It is hard to go beyond 
this intuition and it is hard to get something out of it.
VII.
It may seem that this last issue goes beyond any problems discussed 
in Zagzebski’s book. But it does not. In this example we can see that 
the problem of the possibility of self-reliance, and of basing it on a self-
knowledge, is closely related with the question about my genesis. It is 
possible to say that the three fundamental questions of Kant – what can 
I know? what ought I to do? what may I hope? – depend on an answer 
to this question: where do I come from? And so it seems that the issue 
of self-reliance is a little bit more complicated than it was presented by 
Zagzebski and cannot be easily solved by appealing to some of our natural 
and normal abilities or the common-sense attitude. In my opinion the 
only way to correctly grasp and formulate this issue is to start from the 
position of Descartes, or, generally speaking, from the transcendental 
position, parenthesize our natural attitude, that is everything that 
common sense and the positive sciences proclaim. I  think this is how 
real philosophy should work. Solving philosophical problems by 
appealing to common sense is, unfortunately, mixing two diametrically 
different types of the discourse  – philosophical reflection, on the one 
hand, and our natural attitude on the other. From a philosophical point 
of view such answers (e.g. common sense solutions to philosophical 
questions) are trivial, whereas from a common sense perspective they 
are unnecessary and redundant, because common sense deals with 
them without any explanations. Kant wrote in Prolegomena: ‘To appeal 
to ordinary common sense when insight and sciences run short, and 
not before, is one of the subtle discoveries of recent times, whereby the 
dullest windbag can confidently take on the most profound thinker and 
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hold his own with him. So long as a  small residue of insight remains, 
however, one would do well to avoid resorting to this emergency help.’5 
I think that his opinion still prevails.
5 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come 
Forward as Science, trans. G. Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
p. 259.
